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1 Introdution
What is probability? What is (or should be) the subjet of probability theory? How this
mathematial theory is (or should be) applied to the real world?
These questions were debated for enturies, and these disussions go far beyond the
sope of our paper. However, there is a lear dividing line between two kinds of dierent
approahes; some of them attempt to dene mathematially the notion of an individual
random objet while the others move this notion ompletely to the grey zone between
pure probability theory (understood as a part of mathematis) and its pratial appli-
ations.
In pratie, almost all mathematiians (and most non-mathematiians), looking at
the winning numbers of a lottery for the last year and suddenly notiing that they are
all even, will onlude that something wrong happens. The same feeling would arise
if (as in the Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern are dead, the play by Tom Stoppard) the
long sequene of heads appears while tossing a (presumably fair) oin. However, lassial
probability theory assigns to this sequene (say, 100 heads) the same probability 2−100 as
to any other sequene and does not try to explain why this sequene looks non-random
and raises the suspiion.
This paradox (sequenes with various regularities or symmetries in them appear less
random to us, even when eah of them is just as probable as any other outome), oupied
probabilists already in the nineteenth entury, inluding Laplae.
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C'est ii le lieu de denir le mot extraordinaire. Nous rangeons, par la pensee, tous les evenements
possibles en diverses lasses, et nous regardons omme extraordinaires eux des lasses qui en ompren-
ement un tr es petit nombre. Ainsi, a jou de roix ou pile, l'arrivee de roix ent fois de suite nous
parait extraordinaire, pare ques le nombre presque inni des ombinaisons quit peuvent arriver en ent
oups, etant partage en series reguli eres ou dans lesqulles nous voyone regner un ordre faile  a saisir, et
en series irreguli eres, elles-i sont inomparablement plus nombreuses. La sortie d'une boule blanhe
d'une urne qui, sur un million de boules, n'en ontient qu'une seule de ette ouleur, les autres etant
noires, nous parait enore extraordinaire, pare que nous ne formons que deux lasses d'evenement or-
dinaire, relatives aux deux ouleurs. Mais la sortir du n
◦ 475813, par exemple, d'une urne qui renferme
un million de numeros nous semble un evenement ordinaire, pare que, omparant individuallement les
numeros les uns aux autres, sans les partager en lasses, nous n'avons auune raisone de roire que l'un
d'eux sortira plut ot que les autres. (Essai philosophique sur les Probabilites [20℄, VI Prinipe). Peter
Gas, who used this passage as an opening quote for his Dissertation [12℄, omments: Laplae makes
two informal suggestions (withouth stritly distinguishing them). First, he onsiders various lasses of
events, and views as extraordinary the small ones. (To make this preise, one would need to restrit
attention to simple lasses.) Seond, he makes the assertion (without proof or even exat statement)
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However, the attempts to dene mathematial notions that somehow apture the
intuition of an individual random objet (in some idealized way) are not that old. Rihard
von Mises suggestion (at the beginning of XXth entury) was to base probability theory
on the notion of the so-alled Kollektiv (an individual random sequene). These ideas
were developed, ritially analyzed and made rigorous in 1930s by Wald, Ville and Churh
(the latter gave a rst preise denition of a random sequene).
In 1960s and 1970s these notions were related to the notion of omplexity (amount of
information, dened in algorithmi terms), and now dierent denitions of randomness
are well studied in the framework of reursion theory and algorithmi information theory.
In this paper we try to desribe the main stages of this development and its main
ahievements from the mathematial viewpoint fousing on the role played by martin-
gales.
This paper is based on published soures, disussion at the Dagstuhl meeting (Semi-
nar 06051, 29 January  3 February 2006; C. Calude, C.P. Shnorr, P. Vitanyi gave talks
that were reorded and made available at http://www.hutter1.net/dagstuhl by Mar-
us Hutter) and ontributions of Leonid Bassalygo, Cristian Calude, Peter Gas, Leonid
Levin, Vladimir A. Uspensky, Vladimir Vovk, Vladimir Vyugin and others. It was initi-
ated by Glenn Shafer whose historial omments about Kolmogorov and Ville beame a
starting point. (Of ourse, the people mentioned are not responsible in any way for the
authors' aws.)
2 Colletives
The rst well known attempt to dene mathematially the notion of an individual random
objet was done by Rihard von Mises in his 1919 paper [37℄. Then he elaborated his
ideas in the book published in 1928 [38℄. He also made some larifying omments is his
address delivered on September 11, 1940 at the meeting of the Institute of Mathematial
Statistis in Hanover, N.H. (USA) and published in 1941 [39, 40℄.
Mises explains that probability theory studies a speial lass of natural phenomena,
like tossing a oin, rolling a die, or other repetitive experiments. Geometry tries to ap-
ture and axiomatize the real-world notion of spae; in a similar way probability theory
aptures and axiomatizes the properties of random phenomena, alled olletives (Ger-
man: Kollektiv) in Mises' paper. Informally speaking, olletives are (aording to Mises)
plausible sequenes of outomes we an get by performing innitely many independent
trials of some experiment. He formulated two axioms for the notion of olletives. For
simpliity, we state them for a olletive with two values, e.g., the sequene of heads and
tails obtained by oin tossing (where the oin is potentially unbalaned, i.e., the outome
tails may appear more (or less) often than heads):
I. There exists a limit frequeny: if sN is the number of heads among the rst N oin
tosses, the ratio sN/N onverges to some real p as N →∞.
II. This limit frequeny is stable: if we selet a subsequene aording to some sele-
tion rule, then the resulting subsequene (if innite) has the same limit frequeny.
that all outomes of a given length having some regularity in them, grouped together, would still form
a small lass. (To make this preise, regularity must be dened appropriately.) [14℄
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Axiom I is quite natural: if we want to explain informally what probability is, we
say something like repeat the experiment many times until the frequeny of some event
(say, head on a oin) beomes almost stable; this stable value is alled a probability of
the event.
What is the seond axiom needed for? Remember that olletives should represent
plausible sequenes of outomes of independent trials. Suppose somebody tells you that
ipping a oin produed the sequene
0101010101010101010101010101 . . .
where 0 (heads) and 1 (tails) alternate. Would you believe this? Probably not. Globally,
the limit frequeny of 0 and 1 in this sequene exists and is equal to 1/2. But this
sequene does not look plausible as a sequene of outomes, as it presents some highly
suspiious regularity. This is where axiom II omes into plae: if one selets from this
sequene the bits in even positions, one gets a new sequene
1111111111111111111111111111 . . .
in whih the frequeny of ones is dierent (1 instead of 1/2).
Probability theory, aording to Mises, needs to dene its subjet, and this subjet is
the properties of olletives and operations that transform olletives into other olle-
tives. Mises uses the following example: take a olletive (a sequene of zeros of ones)
and ut it into 3-bit groups. Then replae eah group by an individual bit aording
to the majority rule. Probability theory has to nd the limit frequeny of the resulting
sequene if the limit frequeny of the original one is known.
In his early papers Mises explained in quite informal way whih seletion rules are
allowed: the seletion rule should deide whether a term is seleted or not, using only
the values of the preeding terms but not the value of the term in question. For example,
seletion rule may selet terms whose numbers are prime, or terms that immediately
follow heads in the sequene, but not the terms that are heads themselves.
The existene of olletives, aording to von Mises, is an observation onrmed by
our experiene, e.g., by thousands of people who invented dierent systems to beat the
asino but all failed in the long run (priniple of ausgeshlossenen Spielsystem, as Mises
said).
3 Clariations. Wald's theorem
Of ourse, Mises' approah was quite vulnerable from the mathematial viewpoint. What
is a seletion rule? Do olletives exist at all?
Answering these objetions, Mises adopted a more formal denition of a seletion rule
suggested by A. Wald (see, e.g., [61℄ and [39℄). Assume for simpliity that a sequene is
formed by zeros and ones. The seletion rule is a total funtion s : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}. Here
{0, 1}∗ is a set of all nite binary strings. Applying seletion rule s to an innite binary
sequene ω1ω2 . . . means that we selet all terms ωi suh that s(ω1ω2 . . . ωi−1) = 1; the
seleted terms are listed in the same order as in the initial sequene.
The ondition II for a seletion rule s says that for a olletive the seleted subsequene
either should be nite or should have the same limit frequeny as the entire sequene.
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Therefore we get a formal denition of a olletive as soon we x some lass of seletion
rules. The evident problem here is that if we onsider all seletion rules of the desribed
type, olletives (non-trivial ones, with limit frequeny not equal to 0 or 1) do not exist.
Indeed. for every set S of natural numbers there exists a seletion rule that selets the
terms ωi for i ∈ S (the funtion s depends only on the length of its argument). Using
for a given sequene ω1ω2 . . . the set S of all i suh that ωi = 0 (or ωi = 1), we get a
ontradition.
Wald [61℄
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provided a kind of solution for this problem. He proved that for any
ountable family of seletion rules and for any p ∈ (0, 1) there is a ontinuum of sequenes
that satisfy the axioms I (with limit frequeny p) and II for this lass of seletion rules.
Today this statement looks almost trivial: indeed, if a given seletion rule s is ap-
plied to a Bp-randomly hosen sequene, where Bp is Bernoulli distribution with parame-
ter p, the seleted subsequene has the same distribution Bp, so the Strong Law of Large
Numbers guarantees that the set of sequenes that do not satisfy II for a given s has
Bp-measure zero; the ountable union of null sets is a null set and its omplement has
ontinuum ardinality.
However, Wald wanted to give a onstrutive proof of this result; Theorem V ([61℄,
p. 49) says that if a konstruktiv deniertes abzahlebare System von Auswahlvorshriften
is given, so kann man Kollektiv 〈. . .〉 konstruktiv denieren (if a ountable system of
seletion rules is dened onstrutively, there exists a onstrutively dened olletive).
Note that there is no formal denition of onstrutive objets in Wald's paper; he
just provides a onstrution of a olletive that refers to seletion rules (uses them as an
orale, in modern terminology). The olletive sequene is onstruted indutively. Let
us explain the idea of the onstrution in a simple ase when only nitely many seletion
rules s1, . . . , sn are onsidered and sequene of zeros and ones has limit frequeny 1/2.
At the ith step of the onstrution we should deide whether ωi is 0 or 1. At that time
we already know whih of the rules s1, . . . , sn would inlude ωi in the seleted subsequene.
In other terms, we know a Boolean vetor of length n. The entire sequene (that we have
to onstrut) would be therefore split into 2n subsequenes that orrespond to 2n values of
this Boolean vetor. Now the main idea: eah of these 2n sequenes should be 0101010 . . .
(zeros and ones alternate starting with zero). This determines the sequene ω uniquely.
Sine ω is a mixture of 2n sequenes that have limit frequeny 1/2, the entire sequene
ω has the same limit frequeny.
And if we apply seletion rule si to ω, we get a mixture of 2
n−1
of these subsequenes
(orresponding to 2n−1 Boolean vetors where si is playing). Eah sequene has limit
frequeny 1/2, and their mixture has therefore the same limit frequeny.
In fat the onstrution for ountably many seletion rules is quite similar: we just
have to add new rules one by one when the sequene is so long that the boundary eets
annot destroy the limit frequeny.
In fat Wald proves more: he onsiders not only the two-element set {0, 1}, but any
nite set (Theorem I, p. 45). Then he onsiders the ase of innite set M (Theorem
IIIV, pp. 4547; we do not go into details here, but to get a reasonable denition of a
olletive for innite M one should either onsider ountable M or a restrited lass of
events). Theorems VVI (p. 49) observe that the resulting olletives are onstrutive.
2
A short note without proofs was published earlier [60℄.
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Based on Wald's results, Mises [39℄ onludes that the notion of olletive an be
studied without ontratitions: we an onsider all the seletion rules we want to use
and their ombinations; though we do not know them in advane, one may reasonably
assume that they form a nite or ountable set and therefore olletives (with respet to
this set) do exist.
Wald's results show, in a sense, that the requirements I and II are not too strong.
But other objetions to the notion of olletive, raised by Ville in his book [59℄, say that
these requirements are too weak: not only olletives exist, but one an onstrut some
olletive in the sense of Mises' denition that does not look random.
4 Ville's objetions. Martingales
Let us explain Ville's objetions. The requirement II an be reformulated in terms of
games as follows. (For simpliity we onsider the ase when limit frequeny is 1/2.) A
player omes into a asino where a oin is tossed innitely many times, and an (for
eah tossing) deide to make a bet or to skip it depending on the results of a previous
tossings (aording to the seletion rule she has in mind). Her initial redit is $0, and she
is allowed to inur arbitrarily large debts. All bets are for the same amount of money,
say $1, whih the player loses or doubles, depending on whether her guess was orret or
not. Let cN be the player's apital after N games. The player wins (after innitely many
games) if she makes innitely many bets and the ratio cN/N does not onverge to zero.
(This game deviates from the original idea of a seletion rule: instead of just hoosing
of a subsequene we are allowed also to reverse some of the terms hosen. However,
this gives an equivalent denition sine we may onsider separately the positively and
negatively hosen terms; if both subsequenes have limit frequenies 1/2, the ratio cN/N
does onverge to 0. Note also that this denition assumes that the oin is fair.)
We have reformulated Mises' denition in terms of a game, but this game looks rather
unnatural. Yes, for a really random oin we would expet that cN/N onverges to 0 (at
least after we learned the strong law of large numbers). But is it the only thing we would
expet? Imagine, for example, that cN is always positive and goes slowly but steadily
to innity, so cN/N → 0 but cN → +∞. This would mean that the player manages to
make arbitrarily large amounts of money without inurring debts. In that ase, would
we agree with the assumption that she is playing with a fair oin?
Ville suggested a dierent kind of gambling games, whih are muh more natural. In
his games we ome to the asino with some xed amount of money (say, $1) and an
use it (in whole or in part) for betting, but annot go negative. In other terms, if we
have s before the next game, we an bet any amount s′ ≤ s on zero or one. If our guess
is inorret, the money is lost, and our apital beomes s − s′, otherwise the money is
doubled, and our apital is then s + s′.
Mathematially suh a strategy is represented by a funtion m whose arguments are
nite binary strings and values are non-negative reals. The value m(ω1 . . . ωn) is our
apital after we have played n times getting outomes ω1, . . . , ωn; the value m(Λ) (where
Λ denotes the string of length zero) is the initial apital, whih we assume to be positive.
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The rules of the game ditate that
m(x) =
m(x0) +m(x1)
2
(∗)
Here x is some binary string (representing some moment in the game), x0 and x1 are
obtained by adding 0 or 1 to x and orrespond to two possible outomes in the next
round. The requirement says that m(x) is the average between two possibilities, i.e., our
possible gain and loss are balaned. Ville used the name martingale for funtions that
have property (∗). (One may also allow the martingales to have negative values, but we
use only non-negative martingales in the sequel.)
A martingale m (i.e., the player that uses orresponding strategy) wins against a
sequene ω1ω2 . . . if the values m(ω1ω2 . . . ωn) are unbounded. Now we an swith from
Mises' seletion rules to martingales and say that a sequene ω = ω1ω2 . . . is a olletive
(in a new sense) if all martingales from some (ountable) family do not win against ω.
To support this hange in the lass of games, Ville notes that:
• Martingales provide a generalization of Mises' games (with limit frequeny 1/2): for
any seletion rule one an onstrut a martingale that wins against every sequene
that does not satisfy axiom II when this seletion rule is applied.
• The notion of martingale mathes well the notion of a null set (set of measure 0)
used in lassial probability theory: for every martingalem, the set of all sequenes
against whihm wins is a null set (has measure 0) aording to the uniform Bernoulli
distribution.
• The reverse statement is also true: for every null subset X ⊂ {0, 1}∞ there exists a
martingale m that wins against every element of X . (Together with the strong law
of large number this implies the rst statement in the list).
(The proofs are quite natural: rst we prove the nite versions of these results saying
that (1) the probability to transform initial apital 1 into some C during N games does
not exeed 1/C; (2) for every N and for every set of N -bit sequenes that ontains ε-
fration of all sequenes of length N , there is a martingale that wins 1/ε on every sequene
from this set.)
Martingales have some other nie properties. One may ask why our winning ondition
says that martingale is unbounded: isn't it more natural to require that its values tend
to +∞ (a strong winning ondition)? The answer is that it does not matter muh, as the
following simple observation shows: for every martingalem there exist another martingale
m′ that strongly wins against a sequene ω ifm wins against ω. (The martingalem′ should
save part of the apital when the apital reahes some bound and use only the remaining
part for playing, waiting until it has enough to save again, et.)
Another nie property is the possibility of ombining martingales: if mi are arbitrary
martingales, the weighted sum
∑
i αimi (where αi are some positive reals with sum 1) is a
martingale that wins against a sequene ω if and only if at least one of mi wins against ω.
(Reall that we onsider only non-negative martingales.)
6
5 Ville's example
The arguments above may onvine you that martingales have more nie properties than
just seletion rules.
3
But is this dierene essential? If we swith from seletion rules to
martingales, do we get stronger requirements for random sequenes (olletives)? Ville
showed that it is indeed the ase, proving the following result.
For any ountable family S of seletion rules there exists a sequene ω that
satises requirement II (with limit 1/2) when rules from S are used but every
prex of ω has at least as many zeros as ones ([59℄, p. 63, Remarque).
(In fat, Ville proved more; Theorem 4, p. 55, provides also some bounds for the speed
of onvergeny.)
This proof raises a historial question. In fat, Ville's argument is very lose to
Wald's argument used in [61℄: the sequene is splitted into subsequenes and indutive
onstrution is performed; Wald does not disuss the one-sided onvergene expliitly, but
it is obtained in a straightforward way as a byprodut of Wald's ontrution. Indeed,
let us say that a sequene is biased if every prex has at least as many zeros as ones
(frequeny of ones does not exeed 1/2). If we merge biased sequenes, the result is also
a biased sequene; note also that the sequene 01010101 . . . is biased.
However, Ville does not mention this similarity (though Wald's paper is mentioned
many times in Ville's book and the existene result is quoted with referene to Wald).
It is espeially strange sine the explanations given in Wald's paper are quite lear 
probably more lear than Ville's argument, whih is written in a rather tehnial way.
May be this heavy tehnial style of Ville's paper was the reason why other authors
prefer to give their own reonstrution of the proof instead of following the details of
Ville's paper (see, e.g., [28℄ and referenes within).
6 More about Ville's example
Establishing the dierene between seletion-based and martingale-based denitions of
randomess, Ville also showed that there is a martingale that wins against every biased
sequene (a sequene whose prexes have more zeros than ones). This is a onsequene of
the law of iterated logarithm; it implies that the set of all biased sequenes has measure
zero, so we an use the results mentioned in Setion 4. However, let us provide a simple
diret onstrution of suh a martingale just for illustration.
Let ω be a binary sequene; let dn be the dierene between the numbers of zeros and
ones in n-bit prex of ω. We assume that the dierene dn is always non-negative. The
limit d = lim inf dn is then also non-negative; it an be nite or +∞.
It is easy to onstrut a martingale that wins against any biased sequene with
d = +∞. Imagine that you ome into a asino knowing in advane that (1) the number
3
In fat, at Ville's time these arguments did not sound very onvining even to some experts: W. Feller
wrote in his Zentralblatt review of one of the rst Ville's papers: Aus unerndlihen Grunden will
nun Verf. den Auswahlbegri so abandern (martingale statts Auswahl) daß jede Nullmenge als Aus-
namemenge bei passendem S autreten kann, both reproduing the main argument of Ville (the possibility
to exlude any null set) and nding it unonvining (unerndlihen Grunden), see [49℄.
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of ones never exeeds the number of zeros and (2) the dierene between them tends to
innity. How an you beome innitely rih? Just bet a xed amount (not exeeding
the initial apital) at every step. The ondition (1) guarantees that you will never go
negative and always have enough money to bet; the ondition (2) guarantees that your
apital tends to innity.
Now assume that the asino sequene is biased and d is nite. How an you win then?
In this ase the dierene goes below d only nitely many times, and starting from some
time T it is at least d being equal to d innitely many times. A onlusion: if you see
(after the initial period of length T ) that the dierene is d, you know that the next
oin tossing provides a head, so you bet on it with no risk. This allows you to beome
innitely rih if you know d and T in advane.
So we have one martingalem that wins against any biased sequene with d = +∞ and
a ountable familymd,T of martingales who win against sequenes with given d and T . As
we have noted, this ountable family of martingales an be ombined into one martingale.
There is a large variety of possible interpretation of Ville's example. One an treat
this example as a failure of Mises' approah: it shows that requirements I and II that
guarantee frequeny stability (and therefore establish the very notion of probability) are
not strong enough to provide a satisfatory denition of a random sequene (olletive): a
martingale annot win against a real oin but still an win against a olletive formally
dened in terms of seletion rules.
One may say also that axioms I and II do not pretend to apture all properties of
really random sequene but only some of them needed to dene the notion of probability,
and therefore the Mises' notion of olletive an be onsidered as an upper bound for the
lass of really random sequenes.
Finally, one an say also that replaing seletion rules by a stronger martingale re-
quirement, we harmonize the idea of a random sequene with the measure-theoreti un-
derstanding of laws of probability theory, therefore giving new life to Mises' approah
and getting a better notion of randomness.
It would be interesting to reonstrut the real attitude of Mises, Ville, Frehet and
others; however, this again goes far beyond the sope of the artile. Let us note nev-
ertheless that the only plae where Ville is mentioned in [41℄ has nothing to do with
martingales (it is a paper on game theory). Things beome even more ompliated when
we try to interpret Mises' remark in [37℄ when he says: Solange man etwa nur die Zahlen
110000 betrahtet, bietet die Anordnung der Ziern an der 5. Stelle [in the table of log-
arithms℄ tatsahlih das ungefahre Bild eines empirishes Kollektivs und man kann auh
die Satze der Wahrsheinlihkeitsrehnung naherungsweise darauf anwenden. This quote
shows that for him (at least at that moment) the behavior of the 5th deimal digit in the
table of logarithms of integers 110000 looks like empirial olletive and this sequene
satises the laws of probability theory to a ertain extent (while for bigger numbers the
regularities show up). Note that logarithms are omputable, so there exists a omputable
seletion rule that selets only zeros from this sequene. One may speulate that Mises
had in mind some notion of pseudorandom sequene that satises the axiom II only
for simple enough seletion rules, but this remark remains isolated in his paper and it is
hard to say what he really meant.
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7 Churh denition of randomness
Approximately at the same time, in 1930s, a theory of omputable funtions was devel-
oped by Kleene, Churh, Turing and others. It provided a very natural lass of seletion
rules: omputable rules, where the funtion s : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} is a total omputable
funtion. This lass ontains almost all rules we an think of; it also has nie losure
properties needed to prove theorem about olletives. For example, it is losed under
omposition, and this an be used to prove that a sequene obtained from a olletive by
a seletion rule is again a olletive.
This step (ombining reursion theory with Mises' approah) was done in 1940 by
Churh [10℄: he alled a sequene random if it has limiting frequeny and, moreover, any
omputable seletion rule produes either nite sequene or a sequene with the same
limit frequeny.
In fat, Churh ould do the same with Ville's denition and dene random sequenes
using omputable martingales. But probably he did not realize the importane of mar-
tingales.
More details about the evolution of the randomness notion from Mises to Churh an
be found in a historial survey of Martin-Lof [33℄.
8 An intermission
In the 1940s and 1950s the notion of an individual random sequene did not attrat
muh attention. At that time the measure-theoreti approah to probability theory be-
ame gradually more and more popular (and, in partiular, the notion of martingale was
embedded into the framework of measure theory).
Another important hange during these 20 years was the development of the theory
of omputation. In 1930s theory of omputation appeared as a kind of exoti thing
developed by logiians that is using strange tools like reursive funtions (with quite
unnatural denition), λ-alulus (even more peuliar denition) or tional devies alled
Turing mahines. But after twenty years the notion of a omputer program beame
quite familiar; many mathematiians played with omputers (i.e., programmed them 
omputer games for dummies were almost unknown at that time) as a part of their job
or just for fun.
This prepared a next step in the development of randomness notion when the on-
netions with the omplexity (inompressibility) was understood.
9 Complexity and randomness in 1960s
Reall the question we started with: why does the long sequene of zeros (heads) look
suspiious while the other sequene of the same length (having the same probability 2−n
aording to the lassial theory) looks OK? What is the dierene between these two
sequenes?
Now, when the notion of omputer program beame familiar, the dierene between
them is evident: the rst sequene (zeros) an be generated by a short program while the
other one (non-suspiious) annot.
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So there is no surprise that the ideas of omplexity of a nite objet (dened as the
length of a shortest program that generates this objet) were developed independently in
dierent plaes and by dierent people. This kind of omplexity is often alled desription
omplexity, as opposed to omputation omplexity, sine we ignore the time needed to
generate an objet and look only at the length of the generating program.
There were other (not related to randomness) reasons to onsider desription omplex-
ity. One of these reasons was the quantitative analysis of undeidability. Undeidable
algorithmi problems were disovered in many elds, inluding algorithms theory, math-
ematial logi, algebra, analysis, topology and mathematial linguistis. Their essential
property is their generality: we look for an algorithm that an be applied to every objet
from some innite lass and always gives a orret answer. This general formulation
makes the question not very pratial. A pratial requirement is that algorithm works
for every objet from some nite, though probably very large, lass. On the other hand,
the algorithm itself should be pratial. 〈. . .〉 Algorithm is some instrution, and it is
natural to require that this instrution is not too long, sine we need to invent this al-
gorithm. . . So an algorithmi problem ould be unsolvable in some pratial sense even
if we restrit inputs to some nite set (A.A. Markov [30℄, p. 161; this paper provides
proofs for the results announed in [29℄)
Note also that the idea of measuring the omplexity of a message as the length of its
shortest enoding was quite familiar due to Shannon information theory (though the
enodings onsidered there are very restrited).
Earlier (in [53, 54℄; these papers are based on tehnial reports that go bak to 1960
and 1962) R. Solomono onsidered similar notions in the ontext of indutive inferene
(somebody gives us a long sequene; we want to know what is the reasonable way to
predit the next term of this sequene knowing the preeding terms).
G. Chaitin [9℄ tells that entering a Bronx High Shool of Siene (in 1962) he wrote
an essay where the idea of randomness as an absene of short desription was mentioned;
later, in 1965, after his rst year in City College, he wrote a paper that was submitted
to the Journal of the ACM and nally published in two parts [5, 6℄. In [5℄ he denes a
omplexity measure of a binary string in terms of the size of a Turing mahine; in [6℄ the
omplexity is dened in more general terms (in the same way as in Kolmogorov paper [17℄,
see below).
4
L.A. Levin [25, 26℄ tells that being a student of a high shool for gifted hildren in
Kiev (USSR, now Ukraine) in 1963/4, he was thinking about the length of the shortest
arithmeti prediate that is provable for a single value of its parameter but did not
know how make this denition invariant (how to make the omplexity independent of the
spei formalization of arithmetis). Next year (1964/1965) he moved to Mosow where
a speial boarding shool for gifted hildren was founded by A. Kolmogorov, and told
about this idea to A. Sossinsky who was at that time a teaher in this shool. Sossinsky
asked Kolmogorov and Kolmogorov replied that in one of his forthoming papers this
question was answered.
5
4
The most famous disovery of Chaitin is probably the proof of Godel inompleteness theorem based
on the Berry paradox [7℄; we don't disuss it here.
5
Here is the Russian quotation from [26℄: Òåìà, êîòîðîé Àíäðåé Íèêîëàåâè÷ òîãäà óâëåêàëñÿ 
îáùèå ïîíÿòèÿ ñëîæíîñòè, ñëó÷àéíîñòè, èíîðìàöèè  âîëíîâàëà ìåíÿ ÷ðåçâû÷àéíî. Êàê ìíîãèå
ìîëîäûå ëþäè, ÿ èñêàë ñàìûõ óíäàìåíòàëüíûõ êîíöåïöèé. Íî òàêèå ïåðâè÷íûå òåîðèè, êàê
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This was the paper [17℄ that soon beame the main referene for the denition of om-
plexity; now the omplexity dened as the length of the shortest program is often alled
Kolmogorov omplexity. The paper was alled Three approahes to the quantitative
denition of information, and one of the approahes (the algorithmi one) dened the
omplexity of a binary string as the length of the shortest program produing it, assum-
ing the programming language is optimal, and proves the existene of suh an optimal
language (for the tehnial details see the paper or any of the tutorials on Kolmogorov
omplexity, e.g., [51℄).
This Kolmogorov paper had several historial reasons to beome most popular (among
many expositions of the same ideas, inluding the above mentioned). It was the rst
publiation where the rigorous denition of omplexity was given and universality theorem
was proved. (This was done also in the seond part of Chaitin's artile submitted in
November 1965, after Kolmogorov's publiation, and published only in 1969. Solomono's
papers did not ontain an expliit denition of omplexity.)
Seond, Kolmogorov was famous as one of the greatest mathematiians of his time,
and therefore his papers attrated a lot of attention. And being one of the founders
of probability theory, he has a lear vision of the role that omplexity an play in the
foundations of probability theory (in the denition of individual random objet and in
information theory). So his paper was onise and well written.
6
Therefore it is no
wonder that among many people who ame to very lose ideas, Kolmogorov got the most
ëîãèêà èëè òåîðèÿ àëãîðèòìîâ, ñìóùàëè ìåíÿ ñâîåé êà÷åñòâåííîé ïðèðîäîé  òàì íå÷åãî áûëî
ïîñ÷èòàòü. Íà ñàìîì äåëå, ÿ åù¼ â Êèåâå ïûòàëñÿ äàòü îïðåäåëåíèå ñëîæíîñòè (ÿ íàçûâàë å¼
íååñòåñòâåííîñòü), íî íå ìîã äîêàçàòü å¼ èíâàðèàíòíîñòè. Â Ìîñêâå ÿ ðàññêàçàë î ñâîèõ íåóäà÷àõ
Ñîñèíñêîìó, îí ñïðîñèë Êîëìîãîðîâà è ïðèí¼ñ ìíå ïîðàçèòåëüíûé îòâåò: Êîëìîãîðîâ êàê ðàç
äîêàçàë òî, ÷òî ÿ íå ñìîã è óæå âîò-âîò âûéäåò åãî ïîäðîáíàÿ ñòàòüÿ! Òîãäà ÿ ðåøèë âî ÷òî áû òî
íè ñòàëî ïîñòóïèòü â ÌÓ è ñòàòü ó÷åíèêîì Àíäðåÿ Íèêîëàåâè÷à.
6
Chaitin's papers start with a lot of tehnial details related to the ounting of Turing mahines states.
Solomono's paper [53℄ ontains passages like The author feels that Eq. (1) is likely to be orret or
almost orret, but that the methods of working the problems of Setions 4.1 to 4.3 are more likely to
be orret than Eq. (1). If Eq. (1) is found to be meaningless, inonsistent or somehow gives results that
are intuitively unreasonable, then Eq. (1) should be modied in ways that do not destroy the validity of
the methods used in Setions 4.1 to 4.3  not very enouraging for the readers, to say the least. Levin
remembers that when he was instruted by Kolmogorov to read and ite the work of Solomono, he was
frustrated by this kind of attitude and soon gave up.
Setion 3.2.1 of [53℄ ontains the following sentene: Although a proof [of some statement, related to
a denition alled Eq. (1); this denition ontained an error, as Solomono found later℄ is not available,
an outline of the heuristi reasoning behind this statement will give lues as to the meanings of the terms
used and the degree of validity to be expeted of the statement itself. But later in the same paragraph
a very lear proof of universality theorem is provided for the readers who are not onfused by previous
remarks and are able to extrat its statement out of the proof. This paper also ontained a lot of other
ideas that were developed muh later; e.g., in Setion 3.2 Solomono gives a nie simple formula for
preditions in terms of the onditional a priori probability, using monotoni mahines muh before Levin
and Shnorr. (In 1978 Solomono formally proved that this formula works for all omputable probability
distributions, see [55℄.)
In fat, Solomono's main interest was indutive inferene. He tried to formalize the Oam's Razor
priniple in the following way: base your predition on the simplest law that ts the data, say the
simplest program that ould generate it. This requires a denition of simpleity, and it was in this
ontext that Solomono dened omplexity in terms of desription length and proved its invariane. (His
atual predition formula uses onditional a priori probability, based on all possible programs that t
the data, with longer programs entering with smaller weights.)
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attention.
7
The introdution of the omplexity notion allowed to identify randomness (for nite
bit strings and fair oin) with inompressibility. One should have in mind, however, that
one annot hope to draw a sharp dividing line between random and non-random strings
of a given nite length, and the omplexity funtion K(x) is dened up to a O(1) term,
so, stritly speaking, only asymptoti statements are possible.
7
When Kolmogorov has ame to the denition of omplexity? In his 1963 paper [16℄ Kolmogorov
makes some remarks that partially explain how he ame to the omplexity notion: I have already
expressed the view 〈. . .〉 that the basis for the appliability of the results of the mathematial theory
of probability to real `random phenomena' must depend on some form of the frequeny onept of
probability, the unavoidable nature of whih has been established by von Mises in a spirited manner.
However, for a long time I had the following views:
(1) The frequeny onept based on the notion of limiting frequeny as the number of trials inreases
to innity, does not ontribute anything to substantiate the appliability of the results of probability
theory to real pratial problems where we have always to deal with a nite number of trials.
(2) The frequeny onept applied to a large but nite number of trials does not admit a rigorous
formal exposition within the framework of pure mathematis.
Aordingly I have sometimes put forward the frequeny onept whih involves the onsious use of
ertain not rigorously formal ideas about `pratial reliability', `approximate stability of the frequeny
in a long series of trials', without the preise denition of the series whih are `suiently large'. . .
I still maintain the rst of the two theses mentioned above. As regards the seond, however, I have
ome to realize that the onept of random distribution of a property in a large nite population an
have a strit formal mathematial exposition. In fat, we an show that in suiently large populations
the distribution of the property may be suh that the frequeny of its ourrene will be almost the
same for all suiently large sub-populations, when the law of hoosing these is suiently simple. Suh
a oneption in its full development requires the introdution of a measure of the omplexity of the
algorithm. I propose to disuss this question in another artile. In the present artile, however, I shall
use the fat that there annot be a very large number of simple algorithms. In this quote Kolmogorov
suggested a nitary Mises-style approah that uses seletion rules of bounded omplexity, but does not
explain what omplexity is; also he does not speak here about denition of randomness in terms of
omplexity (diretly, without using seletion rules).
Asked when Kolmogorov ame to his denition of omplexity, Martin-Lof writes [35℄: Kolmogorov
must have arrived at his omplexity denition before autumn 1964, sine Lyonya Bassalygo [Ëåîíèä
Áàññàëûãî℄ told me about it then. [Bassalygo onrms this; he remembers a walk during late autumn
or early spring when Kolmogorov tried to explain him the omplexity denition that was quite diult
to grasp at rst.℄ On the other hand, it should be later than the randomness denition proposed in the
Sankhya paper [16℄ whih was reeived April 1963 by the journal. Those onsiderations pin down the
time of disovery to 196364, more exatly. (Kolmogorov never told me anything about the history of
his disovery.)
[On the other hand,℄ in his obituary note in the Journal of Applied Probability, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 445
450, Marh 1988, K.R. Parthasarathy writes:
Immediately after his arrival in Calutta, Andrei Nikolaevih lost no time in plunging into disussions
with the young students at the Institute about his reent researh work on tables of random numbers,
and the measurement of randomness of a sequene of numbers using ideas borrowed from mathematial
logi. This piee of researh was arried out by him during his travel by ship from the USSR to India;
the ship was atually proeeding on an oeanographi expedition.
This seems to x the time of the disovery of the omplexity denition of randomness to 1962 [at least
in some preliminary form℄ and to loate it to the ship that brought him to India for the reeption of the
degree of Dotor Honoris Causa at the University of Calutta.
Kolmogorov gave several talks at the Mosow Mathematial Soiety but for most of them only the ti-
tles are known, and we may only guess what was there: åäóêöèÿ äàííûõ ñ ñîõðàíåíèåì èíîðìàöèè
(Data redution that onserves information, Marh 22, 1961), ×òî òàêîå èíîðìàöèÿ? (What is
information?, April 4, 1961), Î òàáëèöàõ ñëó÷àéíûõ ÷èñåë (On the tables of random numbers, Oto-
ber 24, 1962, probably orresponding to Sankhya paper [16℄), Ìåðà ñëîæíîñòè êîíå÷íûõ äâîè÷íûõ
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10 Martin-Lof denition of randomness
To obtain suh a sharp borderline one needs to onsider innite sequenes. A natural
idea: to dene randomness of an innite sequene in terms of omplexity of its prexes.
The rst attempt was to say that a sequene ω1ω2 . . . is random ifK(ω1 . . . ωn) is maximal
up to a onstant, i.e.,
K(ω1 . . . ωn) = n+O(1).
But Martin-Lof
8
found that it is not possible (sequene with this property do not exist).
ïîñëåäîâàòåëüíîñòåé (A omplexity measure for nite binary strings, April 24, 1963), Âû÷èñëèìûå
óíêöèè è îñíîâàíèÿ òåîðèè èíîðìàöèè è òåîðèè âåðîÿòíîñòåé (Computable funtions and
the foundations of information theory and probability theory, November 19, 1963), Àñèìïòîòèêà
ñëîæíîñòè êîíå÷íûõ îòðåçêîâ áåñêîíå÷íîé ïîñëåäîâàòåëüíîñòè (Asymptoti behavior of the om-
plexities of nite prexes of an innite sequene, Deember 15, 1964; the title suggest that the last talk
was about Martin-Lof results, though Martin-Lof remembers disussing these results with Kolmogorov
only next spring, see below). Three later talks about algorithmi information theory (19681974) have
short published abstrats (see Appendix A.)
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Per Martin-Lof, a mathematiian from Sweden, studied Russian during his military servie and then
deided to make use of his knowledge by oming to Mosow and working with Kolmogorov.
Martin-Lof tells in [35℄: . . . I had not worked on randomness before oming to Mosow in 196465.
Kolmogorov rst gave me a statistial problem in disriminant analysis, whih I solved, although I did
not nd it hallenging enough. It was a problem that I might just as well have worked on at home in
Stokholm. But I got to know Leonid (Lyonya) Bassalygo [Ëåîíèä Áàññàëûãî℄, and he told me about
Kolmogorov's new ideas about omplexity and randomness, whih I found very exiting. This was in late
autumn 1964. So I started to learn the neessary reursive funtion theory from Uspenskij's book [57℄. . .
It was only when I told Kolmogorov about my rst results on omplexity osillations in innite binary
sequenes in early 1965 that omplexity and randomness beame the subjet of our disussions. (So I did
not learn about Kolmogorov omplexity diretly from Kolmogorov but only indiretly from Bassalygo).
[As to the motivation,℄ I studied the previous literature on random sequenes only after I had made
my own rst ontributions. This resulted in the paper The Literature on von Mises' Kollektivs Revisited
published in the Swedish philosophial journal Theoria [33℄. [As to the predeessors,℄ I have been most
interested in Borel, partiularly beause he was the most important of the early Frenh onstrutivists,
whih Brouwer alled the pre-intuitionists. My aetion for him may also have to do with the fat that
I inherited a opy of Borel's Leons sur la Theorie des Fontions, with its many interesting Notes at the
end, when my grandfather died in 1958 and I was aged 16.
When trying to require the omplexities of the nite initial segments to be as big as possible, I
disovered the unavoidable omplexity osillations about whih I wrote my rst paper on the subjet (in
Russian and typed by Nataliya Dmitrievna Svetlova [Íàòàëüÿ Äìèòðèåâíà Ñâåòëîâà (Ñîëæåíèöûíà)℄,
who beame Solzjenitsyn's wife in her seond marriage). This led me to try the new approah of suitably
interpreting the denition of null set in the sense of reursion theory. I should add that my primary
reason for being interested in innite rather than nite random sequenes was to get rid of the additive
onstants that ropped up everywhere, and whose arbitrariness I found annoying. [This paper,℄ the rst
one of my two Russian papers was never published, but a typed opy of it should still exist somewhere
in my unsorted arhive. However, the results ontained in it were subsequently published in English in
my paper [34℄.
The paper [31℄ is the seond of the two papers that I have written in Russian. It summarizes a talk
that I apparently gave in Mosow on 2 June 1965 and shows very learly that I had not yet reahed the
denition of my Information and Control paper [32℄ though I was on my way.
Kolmogorov was immediately very interested in my two theorems on the unavoidable omplexity
osillations in innite binary sequenes, whih I told him about in the train on our way to Cauasus,
more preisely, Bakuriani [Armenia℄ in early Marh 1965. In fat, he was so positive that he asked me to
present my results as a sequel to a guest leture that he gave in Tbilisi on our way bak in late Marh.
I do not think that he had thought himself about the problem of dening innite random sequenes
by means of his omplexity measure before then. So I think it is orret to say. . . that he was more
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Taking this diulty into aount, Martin-Lof tried a dierent approah and gave a
denition of a random sequene based on eetively null sets, making it more measure-
theoreti. The idea of this approah an be explained as follows.
Let us dene a random bit sequene (for simpliity we onsider only the ase of a fair
oin) as a sequene that satises all probability laws. And probability law is a property
of sequenes that is true for almost all sequenes, i.e., for all sequenes outside some null
set. Finally, a subset X of the Cantor spae {0, 1}∞ (of all innite binary sequenes) is a
null set if its uniform measure is 0 (equivalent formulation: if for every ε > 0 there exists
an innite sequene of intervals that overs X whose total measure is at most ε).
The problem with this denition is that random bit sequenes dened in this way
do not exist at all. Indeed, for every sequene α the singleton {α} is a null set, so its
omplement {0, 1}∞ \ {α} an be onsidered as a probability law, and α does not satisfy
this law.
Martin-Lof pointed out that if we restrit ourselves to eetively null sets, this plan
beomes quite reasonable. A set X is an eetively null set if there exists an algorithm
that (given positive rational ε) generates a sequene of intervals that over X and have
total measure at most ε. (Replaing algorithms with arbitrary funtions, we get a lassial
denition of null sets.) It is easy to see that the union of all eetively null sets is a null set,
sine there are only ountably many algorithms. Therefore random sequenes (dened
as sequenes that do not belong to any eetively null set) exist and the set of random
sequenes has measure 1.
Moreover, Martin-Lof have proved that the union of all eetively null sets is an
eetively null set (in other terms, there exists the largest eetively null set). This
maximal set onsists of all non-random sequenes. A set X is eetively null if and only
if X is a subset of this maximal eetively null set, i.e., X does not ontain any random
sequene.
We an formulate this in the following way. Let P be some property of binary se-
quenes. Then the statements
P (α) is true for every random sequene α
and
the set of sequenes α that do not satisfy P is an eetively null set
are equivalent in the word random in understood in Martin-Lof sense. This is nie
beause people often say, for example, that for a random sequene α the limit frequeny
interested in nite random sequenes. In a way, even if I have myself been interested in getting a good
denition of randomness for innite sequenes, it is more striking that one an give a sensible denition of
randomness already for nite sequenes. Conerning nite random sequenes, my own only ontribution
was the observation that the random elements of a nite population should be the ones whose onditional
omplexity given the population is maximal, that is, approximately equal to the logarithm to the base
2 of the number of elements of the population, whereas Kolmogorov' original suggestion was to use the
unonditional omplexity. So, in the ase of a ompletely random sequene of length n, we should use
K(x1 . . . xn|n) rather thanK(x1 . . . xn), and, in the ase of Bernoulli sequenes, K(x1 . . . xn|n, sn), where
sn = x1 + . . .+ xn.
I never had the opportunity of disussing my own denition of randomness for innite sequenes with
Kolmogorov, simply beause I did not nd it until after I left Mosow in July 1965. It must have been
sometimes during the aademi year 196566. (End of quote.)
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is equal to 1/2 (the strong law of large numbers) having in mind that the set of sequenes
that do not have this property is a null set. Now this sentene an be understood literally
(if a null set is an eetive null set, whih is true in most ases).
Martin-Lof published this denition in 1966 in [32℄). His results were also overed
by a detailed survey paper [62℄. written by two Kolmogorov's young olleagues, Leonid
Levin and Alexander Zvonkin (by Kolmogorov's initiative; Kolmogorov arefully reviewed
this paper one it was nished and suggested many orretions). This survey inluded
Martin-Lof results as well as other results about omplexity and randomness obtained by
the Kolmogorov shool in Mosow. In partiular, a proof of the symmetry of information
(an important result obtained independently by Levin and Kolmogorov) was inluded
there.
9
Martin-Lof denition of randomness at rst seems to be purely measure-theoreti, it
has nothing to do with seletion rules, martingales, and omplexity. However, it turned
out to be losely related to these notions, and it was soon found by dierent authors.
11 Randomness and martingales: Shnorr
During the next deade (19651975; reall that Kolmogorov published his denition of
omplexity in 1965 and Martin-Lof published his denition of randomness in 1966) a lot
of work was done by dierent authors who provided missing links between omplexity,
randomness and games (martingales). One of these authors was C.P. Shnorr.
As he tells [48℄, after nishing his Ph.D. he was looking for new topis. Martin-Lof
gave a ourse in Erlangen, and the leture notes of this ourse were distributed. So this
eld beome known in Germany, Shnorr heard a talk about omplexity and randomness
and beame interested. He wrote several papers and then a book in Leture Notes in
Mathematis series [45℄ based on his 1970 letures (the book is in German; it ontains
referenes to his other papers, inluding [44℄ where many of the results from the book are
presented in English). His habilitation was based on the results obtained in these papers.
In this book for the rst time the notion of martingale was used in onnetion with al-
gorithmi randomness.
10
Shnorr dened a lass of omputable (berehenbare) and lower
semiomputable (subberehenbare) martingales. A funtion f (arguments are strings,
values are reals) is alled omputable if there is an algorithm that omputes the values
of f with any given preision: given x and positive rational ε, the algorithm omputes
some rational ε-approximation to f(x). A funtion is lower semiomputable if there is an
9
Levin realls that being an undergraduate student he wanted to onvine Kolmogorov to be his
advisor and hoped that this result would impress Kolmogorov. But Kolmogorov was rather busy, and
the appointment was postponed several times from February to August 1967. Finally, when Levin alled
him again, Kolmogorov said something like: O yes, ome to see me, I have very interesting results, the
information is symmetri.  But, Andrei Nikolaevih, this is exatly what I wanted to tell you. 
But do you know that the symmetry is only up to logarithmi terms?  Yes.  And you an give
a spei example?  Yes. Then Levin ame to see Kolmogorov, they disussed these results (later
announed in [18℄ without proof; the rst proof appeared in [62℄). Levin indeed worked with Kolmogorov
during his undergraduate years and even earlier (the rst Levin's result was obtained under Kolmogorov's
supervision when Levin was in high shool and published later as [21℄) but V.A. Uspensky was oially
listed as his undergraduate advisor for some formal reasons (see below).
10
As Shnorr said in his talk [48℄, he had not read Ville's book, but learned the notion of martingale
indiretly through other soures.
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algorithm that, given x, generates all rational numbers that are less than x. It is easy to
see that f is omputable if and only if both f and −f are lower semiomputable.
Shnorr then proved that a sequene is Martin-Lof random if and only if no semiom-
putable martingale wins against it, thus providing a riterion of Martin-Lof randomness
in terms of martingales. (A tehnial remark: note that the initial apital an be non-
omputable in our setting.) Shnorr, however, was not satised with this notion (lower
semiomputability). He found it rather ounter-intuitive: there is no evident reason why
we should generate approximations from below (but not above) to martingale values. So
he thought that this lass of martingales is too broad and, therefore, the orresponding
lass of sequenes is too narrow. So he alled Martin-Lof random sequenes hyper-
zufallig (hyperrandom; this name is not in use now). He proved that there exists a
sequene that wins against all omputable martingales but is not Martin-Lof random.
Shnorr also dened the notion of lower semiomputable supermartingale. A funtion
m is a supermartingale if it satises the supermartingale inequality,
m(x) ≥
m(x0) +m(x1)
2
.
In game terms this means that player is allowed to throw away her money during the game.
Shnorr proved that lower semiomputable supermartingales an be used for Martin-Lof
randomness riterion in plae of martingales.
Trying to nd a better denition of randomness, Shnorr onsidered a smaller lass
of eetively null sets (now alled sometimes Shnorr null sets). As we have said,
for an eetively null set X there exists an algorithm that given ε > 0 generates a
sequene of intervals that over X and have total measure at most ε. Shnorr introdued
a stronger requirement: this total measure should be equal to ε. (This sounds a bit
artiial; more natural equivalent denition asks for a omputably onverging series of
the length of overing intervals.) The sequenes that are outside all Shnorr null sets are
alled zufallig (now they are sometimes alled Shnorr random sequenes). Shnorr
proved that this is indeed a broader lass of sequenes than hyperzufallig (Martin-Lof
random). He also proved a riterion in terms of omputable martingales: a sequene is
zufallig if and only if no omputable martingale omputably wins on it (omputably
wins means that there exists a non-dereasing unbounded omputable funtion h(n)
suh that the player's apital after n steps is greater than h(n) for innitely many n).
Shnorr's papers and book ontain a lot of other interesting things whih were devel-
oped muh later. For example, he onsiders how fast player's apital inreases during the
game and proves that if a sequene does not satisfy the strong law of large numbers, then
there exists a omputable martingale that wins exponentially fast against it (muh later,
in 2000s, the growth of martingales was explored farther in onnetion to the notions of
eetive dimension).
As Shnorr explains, one of his goals was to approah the notion of pseudorandom-
ness. Sometimes even a sequene generated by an algorithm looks similar to a random
one; suh sequenes may be used when the soure of physial randomness is unavailable
and sometimes are alled pseudorandom, though this term may have dierent more
or less preise meanings. One of the possible approahes to this phenomenon is that a
pseudorandom objet may have a short desription, but the time needed for the de-
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ompressing algorithm to proess this desription is unreasonably large.
11
So Shnorr
onsiders also omplexity with bounded resoures in his book.
12 Supermartingales and semimeasures
Shnorr's lower semiomputable supermartingales are losely related to other notion
that appeared in Zvonkin and Levin's 1970 paper [62℄, the notion of a semiomputable
semimeasure. It is easy to see that martingale (as dened above) is just a ratio of two
measures on the Cantor spae: an arbitrary one and the uniform one. More formally,
let Q be any measure on Cantor spae and let P be the uniform Bernoulli measure.
Then the ratio Q(Ix)/P (Ix), where Ix is the interval rooted at binary string x (the set of
all extensions of x), is a martingale. Moreover, every martingale an be represented in
this way. The supermartingales orrespond in the same way to objets that Levin alled
semimeasures.
A semimeasure is a measure on the set Σ of all nite and innite binary sequenes.
Let Σx be the set of all extensions (nite and innite) of a binary string x. Then Σx =
Σx0 ∪ Σx1 ∪ {x}. If Q is a measure on Σ, the inequality
Q(Σx) ≥ Q(Σx0) +Q(Σx1)
holds; moreover, any non-negative real-valued funtion q on nite strings that satises
the inequality q(x) ≥ q(x0) + q(x1), determines a measure on Σ. The dierene between
both sides of this inequality is the probability of the nite string x. A semimeasure is
lower semiomputable if the funtion x 7→ q(x) = Q(Σx) is lower semiomputable.
Lower semiomputable semimeasures are onsidered in [62℄; Levin proved that they
an be equivalently dened as output distributions of probabilisti mahines that have
no input, use internal fair oin and generate their output sequentially (bit by bit). Levin
proved also that there exists a maximal lower semiomputable semimeasure (universal
semimeasure, sometimes alled a priori probability on the binary tree). This notion an
be also onsidered as a formalization of Solomono's ideas.
The onnetion between semimeasures and supermartingales: supermartingales an
be dened as frations where the numerator is a semimeasure and denominator is the
uniform Bernoulli measure (similar to the desription of martingales as frations of two
measures). Lower semiomputable semimeasures orrespond to lower semiomputable
supermartingales. This representation of (semi)martingales as ratios an be easily gener-
alized to other probability distributions, e.g., to the ase of a non-symmetri oin. If P
is the distribution delared by the game organizers (now not neessarily uniform), then
in the fair game the player's apital is a P -martingale, i.e., the ratio Q/P where Q is
some measure. (The notion of martingale with respet to a non-uniform measure was
also onsidered by Shnorr in [45℄.)
In a similar way P -supermartingales (that allow the player to disard some money
at eah step) an be dened as ratios Q/P where Q is a semimeasure. This implies,
11
Later a more pratial theory of pseudorandom sequenes was developed by Yao, Blum, Miali and
others. Now it is a very important part of omputational ryptography, see, e.g., the textbook [15℄.
Shnorr later also worked in the eld of omputational ryptography.
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for example, that for any omputable measure P there exists a maximal lower semi-
omputable P -supermartingale: it is the ratio A/P where A is the a priori probability
(the largest lower semiomputable semimeasure). The last observation provides a on-
netion between maximal P -supermartingales for dierent P ; as Levin points in one of
the letters to Kolmogorov (see the Appendix) the advantage of the a priori probability
notion is that the same notion an be ompared to dierent measures. When swith-
ing from (semi)measures to (super)martingales one objet (the a priori probability) is
transformed into a family of seemingly dierent objets (maximal lower semiomputable
supermartingales with respet to dierent omputable measures).
However, a natural goal: to obtain a riterion of randomness (for innite sequenes)
in terms of omplexity of their prexes (the idea to relate omplexity and randomness
was present already in the 1965 Kolmogorov publiation [17℄) was not ahieved either in
Zvonkin and Levin paper or in Shnorr's book. This was done few years later when new
versions of omplexity (monotone and prex omplexities) appeared.
13 Prex omplexity
Prex omplexity was introdued by Levin and Chaitin. Sine the introdution of prex
omplexity sometimes beomes a soure of unneessary ontroversy, some historial lari-
ations would be useful here. To put the story short, the rst publiations where (1) the
prex omplexity was dened in terms of self-delimiting odes and as the logarithm of the
maximal lower semiomputable onverging series, and (2) the laim that these denitions
oinide was made (without proofs), are [23, 11℄. These publiations appeared in 1974
in Russian; English translations of these two papers were published in 1976 and 1975
respetively (see [13℄); the logarithm of the maximal lower semiomputable onverging
series (but not the self-delimiting desriptions) was onsidered also in unpublished thesis
of Levin in 1971.
12
In 1970 paper [62℄ an a priori probability (on a binary tree, as dened
12
Let us add some historial remarks about situation in the Mathematis Department of Mosow
State University and in Russia at that time. The typial trak of a future mathematiian at that
time was 5 years of undergraduate studies (âûñøåå îáðàçîâàíèå) plus 3 years of graduate shool
(àñïèðàíòóðà). After the graduate shool student is assumed to defend a thesis and get a title kandidat
ziko-matematiheskih nauk (êàíäèäàò èçèêî-ìàòåìàòè÷åñêèõ íàóê) whih is a rough equivalent of
Ph.D. Unlike the US universities, the student of Mosow State University (and other Soviet universities)
had to deide what is his major before entering the university: e.g., the mathematis and physis pro-
grams are administered by dierent departments, have no ommon ourses, dierent entrane proedures
et. After two years of undergraduate studies at mathematis department, a student had to hoose a
division (êàåäðà) whih he wants to join for three remaining years, and a sienti advisor in the
hosen division. (It ould be, say, Algebra Division, or Geometry and Topology Division, et.) At the
end of the 5th year student writes a thesis (äèïëîìíàÿ ðàáîòà). Sometimes this thesis is onsidered as
something lose to the Master thesis in the US.
To enter the graduate shool after nishing 5 years of undergraduate studies, one needed a good
aademi reord and (a very important ondition!) a reommendation from the loal ommunist party
and komsomol (êîìñîìîë) organization. Komsomol (an abbreviation for êîììóíèñòè÷åñêèé ñîþç
ìîëîä¼æè, ommunist union of the young people), like Hitlerjugend in Germany, was almost obligatory,
and inluded people of age 1428, so most university students were komsomol members (êîìñîìîëüöû),
though there were some exeptions and this requirement was never formalized as a law.
Levin was a student of a speial boarding shool founded by Kolmogorov (unoially alled Kol-
mogorov's boarding shool, êîëìîãîðîâñêèé èíòåðíàò); during 1963/4 aademi year he was a student
18
in this paper) of a sequene 0n1 is onsidered (last paragraph on p. 107) and some prop-
erties of this quantity are proved, though no name is given for it; this quantity oinides
with a maximal lower semiomputable onverging series (up to O(1) fator, as usual).
At the same time Chaitin independently ame to the same two denitions (self-
delimited omplexity and logarithm of probability) in [8℄; this paper, submitted in 1974,
ontained, among other results, the rst published proof of their equivalene. (See more
of a similar shool in Kiev (now Ukraine) and then managed to move to Mosow for 1964/5 aademi
year. Then (in January 1966) he entered the Mosow university beoming a rst-year undergraduate in
the middle of the aademi year (there was some exeptional proedure for the students of Kolmogorov's
shool in this year related to the hange in the eduation system in the USSR that moved from 11-years
to 10-years eduation program).
Being not only Jewish (already a handiap at that time) but also a kind of non-onformist, Levin as an
undergraduate student reated a lot of troubles for loal university authorities. As a member of komsomol,
he beame eleted loal komsomol leader but he deed the poliies established by the Communist Party
supervisors (and this was mentioned in his graduation letter of reommendation, a very important
doument at the time). No wonder he was eetively barred from applying to any graduate shool
when he nished undergraduate studies at the Mathematial Logi Division (êàåäðà ìàòåìàòè÷åñêîé
ëîãèêè) in 1970. (His oial undergraduate advisor was Vladimir A. Uspensky who was Kolmogorov's
student in 1950s. Kolmogorov oially did not belong to Mathematial Logi division and asked his
former student Uspensky to replae him in this apaity.) However, Kolmogorov managed to seure a
researh sientist position for Levin (with the help of the University retor, a prominent mathematiian
and a very deent person, I.G. Petrovsky) in the University statistial laboratory (Kolmogorov was a
head of this laboratory).
Being there, in 1971 Levin wrote a kandidat thesis (that ontained mostly Levin's results inluded
in [62℄, but also some others, inluding the probabilisti denition of prex omplexity) and tried to
nd a plae for its defense. (Aording to the rules, the thesis defene was not tehnially onneted to
a graduate shool (if any) of defendant's aliation, only a reommendation from the institution where
dissertation was prepared was required; in this ase the person was alled ñîèñêàòåëü. Though most
graduate students in the USSR were defending their thesis in the same institution (sometimes a few
years later after their studies in the graduate shool), the thesis defense was not a university aair, but
regulated by a speial government institution, alled Âûñøàÿ Àòòåñòàöèîííàÿ Êîìèññèÿ.)
In Mosow it was learly impossible, and nally the defense took plae in Novosibirsk (in Siberia).
The thesis reeived strong approvals from oial reviewers (J. Barzdin, B. Trahtenbrot and his lab),
the reviewing institutions (Leningrad Division of Steklov Mathematial Institute) and the advisor (Kol-
mogorov and his lab). Nevertheless, the defene was unsuessful (quite untypial event). Aording
to Levin, the most ative negative role during the ounil meeting was played by Yu.L. Ershov (reur-
sion theorist, now a member of the Russian Aademy of Sienes) but Levin believes that Ershov did
not have other hoie unless he was ready to get into areer troubles himself; however, Ershov did also
something above and beyond the all of duty (as Levin puts it) as a Soviet sienti funtionaire  he
insisted that the unlear politial position of Levin should be mentioned in the ounil deision. This
eetively prevented Levin's defense in any other plae in the Soviet Union (even with a new thesis) and
therefore barred a sienti areer in Soviet Union for him. Fortunately, Levin got a permission to leave
Soviet Union and emigrated to US where he got many well known results in dierent areas of theoretial
omputer siene (about one-way funtions, holographi proofs et al.). As Levin realls, KGB made it
known that they think going away would be the best option for him; they even asked Kolmogorov to
deliver this advie (whih Kolmogorov did, though he did not indiated whether he himself agrees. . . )
Now we an make jokes about these events (Levin one noted that a posteriori Ershov's behaviour was
a favor for him: it was a motivation to leave Soviet Union) but at that time things were muh more
dramati.
But while being still in the USSR after this unsuessful defense, Levin followed an advie of some
friend, who told that Levin should publish his results while he is still allowed to publish papers in Soviet
journals (this was not a joke, the danger was quite real) and published a bunh of papers in 19731977.
These papers were rather short and rypti, a lot of things was stated there without proofs, so many
ideas from them were really understood only muh later.
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about the history of this paper below.)
The prex omplexity, as we have said, an be dened in dierent ways. The rst ap-
proah denes prex omplexity of x as the length of the shortest program that produes
x, but the programming language must satisfy an additional requirement. In Levin's
paper [23℄ this requirement is formulated as follows: if a bit string p onsidered as a pro-
gram produes some output x, then its extensions either produe the same x or do not
produe anything. The 1974 paper refers for details to Gas' paper of the same year [11℄
13
and to other Levin's paper (then unpublished; it was published only in 1976 [24℄). In
Chaitin's paper mentioned above [8℄
14
a slightly dierent requirement is used: if a bit
string p onsidered as a program outputs x, then none of p's extension ould produe any
output. Both restritions reet the intuitive idea of a self-delimiting program (that does
not ontain an end-marker; the mahine should be able to nd out when the program
ends) though in tehnially dierent ways.
Another way to dene prex omplexity uses probabilities; as we have mentioned,
it appeared in Levin's thesis (1971) that remained unpublished. Consider the lower
semiomputable series of non-negative reals with sum at most 1 (
∑
pn ≤ 1 where pn ≥ 0
and the funtion n 7→ pn is lower semiomputable). These series orrespond to mahines
that use internal fair oin to produe some integer (or, may be, do not produe anything)
if we let pn be the probability of output n.
We will trae only two main ontributions made in these papers: the prex omplexity, and the
randomness riterion in terms of monotone omplexity.
13
Peter Gas ame to Mosow State University for 1972/3 aademi year from Hungary where he
beame interested in this topi after reading Kolmogorov paper [17℄, Martin-Lof leture notes from
Erlangen and Zvonkin and Levin's paper [62℄ and started orrespondene with Levin by sending him
some paper about randomness haraterization in terms of omplexity. When Gas ame to Mosow in
1972, Levin explained his riterion of randomness in terms of monotone omplexity whih looked muh
better to Gas so his paper was never published. Then Levin explained the notion of prex omplexity
to Gas and asked whether it is symmetri (with O(1) preision). The negative answer obtained by Gas
beame part of his paper [11℄ that inluded also some Levin's results, inluding the O(1)-formula for the
prex omplexity of a pair (attributed to Levin). The prex omplexity is very briey introdued in the
beginning of this paper with the remark onsidered in detail by Levin.
14
This paper was written [9℄ in 1974 during the visit to the IBM Watson Lab in Yorktown Heights
for a few months. Chaitin's work there has another important impliation: an unpublished manusript
by R. Solovay [56℄. In his talk [4℄ Cristian Calude tells the story: When I started reading and trying
to understand the subjet to write my book Information and Randomness [3℄, I disussed this with
Greg Chaitin and he told me: look, if you really want to write a good book, you have to read Solovay's
manusript. . . So I started asking around, and eventually wrote to Solovay: Greg Chaitin told me that
I should read your manusript; ould I have a opy? Solovay answered: I had one, but I don't have it
any more. This was in 1991, I think. I tried again to get it and eventually I ontated Charles Bennett,
and he had one opy; he was very kind to send me a opy of this opy. That is also an interesting story
whih Greg Chaitin told me about how this book [manusript℄ was written. Solovay was for one year
at IBM on a sabbatial leave and he was asked to write a report about Chaitin's work. Probably most
of us would write a report of two or three pages and forget forever about it. But Solovay took it very
seriously, so he rewrote many parts of the theory in his ompletely dierent new style, and he solved
also a substantial number of open problems at that stage. This was a kind of shok: look, this guy is
so bright, he has nothing to do with this eld, he omes, he reads this bunh of papers, he produes
this beautiful manusript solving so many problems and at the end of the day he does not want even to
publish anything! Solovay never published this manusript. I sent Solovay a opy of his `lost' manusript
and he said: well, if you have a student or whoever would like to read and edit and publish the book,
ne with me, but I am not interested in working on it. It had to wait until Rod Downey and Denis
Hirshfeldt had the fore to get through and reuperate most of the results in this manusript.
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Among those series there exists a maximal one (up to O(1) fator). It is alled a priori
probability on integers (and is losely related to the a priori probability on bit strings
onsidered in ZvonkinLevin paper [62℄: a priori probability of a bit string 0n1 oinides
with the a priori probability of integer n up to O(1) fator).
A very important property of these notions: minus binary logarithm of an a priori
probability equals prex omplexity (up to O(1) additive term). This property is men-
tioned without proof both in [11℄ and [23℄; the proof was published for the rst time in [8℄.
This proof implies also that two version of prex-free requirements mentioned above lead
to the same omplexity funtion (up to O(1) additive term).
Another advantage of prex omplexity, also disovered independently by Levin (the
proof, attributed to Levin, is published in [11℄) and Chaitin (the proof is published in [8℄)
is a more preise (up to O(1)-term) formula for the omplexity of a pair in terms of
onditional omplexities. This formula is an improvement of the symmetry of information
theorem that was earlier proved for plain omplexity with bigger (logarithmi) error terms
by Kolmogorov and Levin.
14 Randomness riterion: Shnorr and Levin
It was soon understood by Shnorr and Levin that the original goal of desribing ran-
domness in terms of omplexity an be ahieved if one hanges a bit the denition of
omplexity making it monotoni in some sense.
Shnorr suggested suh a modiation in his talk at 4th STOC in 1972 [46℄. The idea
of the modiation was to take into aount that prexes of a sequene are not separate
binary strings but prexes of one innite sequene. As Shnorr puts it ([46℄, pp. 168
169), it has already been observed that there must be some dierene in the onept
of regularity of nite objets whih do not involve a diretion (for instane a natural
number) and the onept of regularity of innite sequenes (as well as nite subsequenes
[prexes℄ of an innite sequene) where a natural diretion is involved. For example,
he who wants to understand a book will not read it bakwards, sine the omments or
fats whih are given in his rst part will help him to understand subsequent hapters
(this means they help him to nd regularities in the rest of the book). Hene anyone
who tries to detet regularities in a proess (for example an innite sequenes or an
extremely long nite sequene) proeeds in the diretion of the proess. Regularities
that have ever been found in an initial segment of the proess are regularities for ever.
Our main argument is that the interpretation of a proess (for example to measure his
omplexity) is a proess itself that proeeds in the same diretion.
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Then he gives a
formal denition of monotone omplexity, alled proess omplexity in his paper, and
notes that basi properties of proesses have been developed independently in [5℄ and
[8℄ (i.e., [45℄ and [62℄ in our list; note that none of these two publiations inludes a
denition of monotone/proess omplexity).
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This argument sounds onvining; however, one may expet that randomness of a binary sequene
is invariant under omputable permutation of its terms while Shnorr's riterion of randomness in terms
of monotone omplexity is not. Reently A. Rumyantsev pointed out the following simple invariant
riterion: KP(A,ω(A)) ≥ |A| − O(1). Here KP stands for the prex omplexity of a pair; A is a nite
set of indies of size |A| and ω(A) is a restrition of ω onto A (a bit string of length |A|).
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Using his denition, Shnorr proves that a sequene in Martin-Lof random if and only
if its n-bit prex has monotone omplexity n+O(1).
Levin [22℄ proves essentially the same result using a slightly dierent version of the
monotone omplexity (used also in subsequent paper of Shnorr [47℄). Levin also notes
that the same proof works for the so-alled a priori omplexity, the minus logarithm
of the a priori probability on the binary tree. This statement is equivalent to Shnorr's
haraterization of randomness in terms of semiomputable supermartingales (though
Levin does not say anything about martingales).
Chaitin in [8℄ suggested prex omplexity as a tool to dene randomness. He alls an
innite sequene ω1ω2 . . . random if there exists c suh that
H(ω1 . . . ωn) ≥ n− c
for all n (he used letter H to denote prex omplexity; Levin used KP ; now the letter K
is most often used), and writes: C.P. Shnorr (private ommuniation) has shown that
this omplexity-based denition of a random innite string and P. Martin-Lof statistial
denition of this onept are equivalent. As Shnorr remembers in his talk [48℄, I knew
the rst paper of Chaitin that has been published one year later after the Kolmogorov's
1965 paper but it was the next paper whih really made Chaitin also one of the basi
investigators of omplexity. This was a paper on self-delimiting or prex-free desriptions
and this was published in 1975 in the Journal of the ACM. In fat I was a referee of
this paper and I think Chaitin knew this beause I've sent my personal omments and
suggestions to him and he used them.
15 Lower semiomputable random reals
One more result about randomness in [8℄ is an example of a lower semiomputable random
real number, now well known as Chaitin's Ω number. It is related to a philosophial
question: an we speify somehow an individual random sequene? One would expet
at rst the negative answer: if a sequene has some desription that denes it uniquely,
how an we treat it as random?
This negative answer is supported by the (evident) result: a omputable sequene is
not Martin-Lof random (for the ase of a fair oin, i.e., the uniform Bernoulli distribution).
However, if we do not insist that desription is an algorithm that omputes our sequene
and let it be less diret, the answer beomes positive. Indeed, in [62℄ the following result
attributed to Martin-Lof is stated (Theorem 4.5): there exists a Σ02-sequene that is
Martin-Lof random. This means that there exist a deidable property R(n, p, q) of three
natural numbers suh that the sequene ω dened by equivalene
ωn = 1 ⇔ ∃p ∀q R(n, p, q)
is Martin-Lof random. This provides an example of an individual expliitly desribed
(though in a non-onstrutive way) random sequene.
The example of a random Σ02-sequene appears also in Theorem 4.3 in Chaitin's
1975 paper [8℄, but Chaitin went farther in this diretion. He notied that a Martin-Lof
random sequene an be a binary representation of a lower semiomputable real number.
Speaking about random reals, we identify real numbers in the interval (0, 1) with their
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binary representations. (The ollisions like 0.0011111 . . . = 0.0100000 . . . do not matter
sine this an happen only for non-random sequenes.) Reall that a real number x is
lower semiomputable if there is an algorithm that enumerates all rational numbers less
than x. (Equivalent denition: if x is a limit of an inreasing omputable sequene of
rational numbers.) It is easy to see that all lower semiomputable reals x ∈ (0, 1) have
binary representations in Σ02 but the reverse statement is not true.
This alone wouldn't make Chaitin's example of lower semiomputable random real
so popular. In fat, Setion 4.4 of [62℄ (proof ot Theorem 4.5 mentioned above) already
onstruts a spei example of a random real, i.e., the smallest real outside an eetive
open set of small measure that overs all non-random reals. Zvonkin and Levin used the
language of binary sequenes, not reals (whih makes the desription a bit more tedious)
and did not mention expliitly the lower semiomputability (whih follows immediately
from the onstrution). But the main reason why Chaitin's example beame so famous
is in the form of the desription. Chaitin's lower semiomputable real Ω has simple and
intuitive meaning: it is the probability that the universal mahine used in the denition
of prex omplexity terminates on a randomly hosen program. This ould reate an
impression that we really have a random real in our hands: this is the probability of
the event the universal mahine terminates on random input.
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16 Subsequent ahievements
The study of randomness as a mathematial objet had learly a philosophial motiva-
tion related to the foundations of probability theory. However, the mathematial theory
has its own logi of development: answering some philosophially motivated questions, it
introdues new notions and new questions related to these notions. So the mathematial
theory of randomness (and related algorithmi information theory) beame a rih math-
ematial subjet. In the last deade it attrated a lot of attention from the reursion
theorists who used advaned tehniques developed in reursion theory to understand the
randomness denitions better. For example, they looked at one of the rst denitions
of randomness (from Kolmogorov's papers) and proved that it oinides with Martin-Lof
randomness relativized to 0
′
-orale [42, 36℄.
The other thread that has some philosophial and historial interest is related to non-
monotoni seletion rules and martingales. In Mises denition the terms of the sequene
are revealed in some xed order (time order, if we look at asino's example). He never
expliitly mentioned other possibilities (though he sometimes writes about data whose
ordering is not lear, like statistial data about deaths used by an insurane ompany).
When he was fored to provide a formal denition of a seletion rule, this monotoniity
is expliitly present in the denition.
However, one an onsider other examples that motivate non-monotoni seletion.
Imagine that asino prepares random bits and write them on ards whih are then plaed
on a table (so that bits are invisible). The player is then allowed to look at the ards in
16
A similar thing was done one to test early Unix utilities: they were fed with random bits and rashed
quite often! In fat, standard programming languages and exeutable le formats satisfy Chaitin's
requirements for universal mahine if we ignore that mahine word has nite size, usually between 8
and 64 bits.
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any order and also make bets (before the ard is turned). Imagine that she manages to
win systematially; does it implies that the sequene is not random?
As D. Loveland [27℄ explains this: Consider the following pratial situation. A
manufaturer produes very heaply and quikly some item whih has a large utuation
in life expetany from item to item, with the utuation passing through a threshold of
aeptane. The produer would naturally wish to ull out the unaepted items but (it
is presumed) annot test the item to be used for life expetany without destroying it.
He must then look for systemati utuations in the proess so that he an selet the
items to be used based on the knowledge of the proess inluding knowledge of tested
items then ineligible for use. If the proess were random in the aforementioned sense,
then no system of testing previously manufatured items would indiate whether the next
item manufatured should be hosen for use or whether one should hoose, rather, some
future item after more testing. However, suppose the manufaturer numbers eah item
onseutively as it is produed and allows it to fall it into a bin from whih items are
drawn to be tested or seleted for use. Then he may test higher numbered items before
digging down in the bin to selet a spei item for use.
Earlier the same extension was suggested by Kolmogorov in a footnote in his pa-
per [16℄. It led to many interesting questions. For example, how omplex should be
prexes of a sequene that is random in the sense of MisesChurh denition and in this
extended MisesKolmogorovLoveland denition? Kolmogorov laimed [18℄ that in both
ases omplexity ould be logarithmi, but later An. Muhnik has shown that it is not
the ase (see [58℄) for MisesKolmogorovLoveland randomness (while for MisesChurh
randomness Kolmogorov was right).
Many other interesting results are obtained but their desription goes far beyond the
sope of this paper.
17 Conluding remarks
Remember that Mises' initial reason to onsider olletives was the desire to explain what
probability is and why and how the mathematial probability theory an be applied to
the real world. The question why is rather philosophial one, but one an try to answer
to seond part, how, and desribe the urrent best pratie. Here is an attempt to
provide suh a desription taken from [58, 50℄.
The appliation of probability theory has two stages. At the rst stage we try to
estimate the onordane between some statistial hypothesis and experimental results.
The rule the atual ourrene of an event to whih a ertain statistial hypothesis
attributes a small probability is an argument against this hypothesis (Polya [43℄, Vol. II,
Ch. XIV, part 7, p. 76), it seems, ould be made more orret if we are allowed to onsider
only simply desribed events. It is lear that the event 1000 tails appeared an be
desribed more simply that the event a sequene A appeared where A is a random
sequene of 1000 heads and tails (these two events have the same probability). This
dierene may explain why our reations to these events (we have in mind the hypothesis
of a fair oin) are so dierent. To larify the notion of a simply desribed event the
notion of omplexity of the onstrutive objet (introdued by Kolmogorov) may be
useful.
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Let us assume that we have already hosen a statistial hypothesis onordant (as we
think) with the result of observations. Then we ome to the seond stage and derive some
onlusions from the hypothesis hosen. Here we have to admit that probability theory
makes no preditions but an only reommend something: if the probability (omputed
on the basis of the statistial hypothesis) or an event A is greater than the probability
of an event B, then the possibility of the event A must be taken into onsideration to a
greater extent than the possibility of the event B.
One an onlude that events with very small probabilities may be ignored. Borel [1℄
writes . . . Fewer than a million people live in Paris. Newspapers daily inform us about
the strange events or aidents that happen to some of them. Our life would be impossible
if we were afraid of all adventures we read about. So one an say that from a pratial
viewpoint we an ignore events with probability less that one millionth. . . Often trying to
avoid something bad we are onfronted with even worse. . . To avoid this we must know
well the probabilities of dierent events (Russian ed., pp. 159160).
Sometimes the riterion for seletion of a statistial hypothesis and the rule for its
appliation are united in the statement events with small probabilities do not happen.
For example, Borel writes One must not be afraid to use the word ertainty to designate
a probability that is suiently lose to 1. ([2℄, Russian ed., p. 7). But we prefer to
distinguish between these two stages, beause at the rst stage the existene of a simple
desription of an event with small probability is important, and at the seond stated it
seems unimportant. (We an expet, however, that events interesting to us have simple
desriptions beause of their interest.)
This desription (whih, we believe, still desribes adequately the urrent best pratie
of probability theory appliation) uses the notions of algorithmi information theory only
one (when desribing when we rejet a statistial hypothesis), but this use seems to be
important.
Let us note also that this desription shows that quantum mehanis does not make a
real dierene ompared to probability theory and statistial mehanis: we just replae
small probability by small amplitude in the sheme desribed. (However, to provide
a foundation for the measurement proedure, one should prove a quantum ounterpart
for the law of large numbers: the amplitude of the event measured frequeny of some
outome diverges signiantly from the square of the assumed amplitude of this outome
is small.)
More detailed disussion an be found in [52℄.
Appendix A: Abstrats of Kolmogorov's talks
Some talks at the meetings of Mosow Mathematial Soiety have short abstrats pub-
lished in the journal Óñïåõè ìàòåìàòè÷åñêèõ íàóê (Uspekhi matematihekikh nauk,
partially translated as Russian mathemathial surveys; these abstrats were not trans-
lated). Here we reprodue abstrats of three talks given by A.N. Kolmogorov devoted to
algorithmi information theory (translated by Leonid Levin).
I. [vol. 23, no. 2, Marh-April 1968℄.
1. A.N. Kolmogorov, Several theorems about algorithmi entropy and algorithmi
amount of information.
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Algorithmi approah to the foundations of information theory and probability theory
was not developed far in several years from its appearane sine some questions raised at
the very start remained unanswered. Now the situation has hanged somewhat. In parti-
ular, it is asertained that the deomposition of entropy H(x, y) ∼ H(x)+H(y|x) and the
formula J(x|y) ∼ J(y|x) hold in algorithmi onept only with auray O([logH(x, y)])
(Levin, Kolmogorov).
Stated earlier ardinal distintion of algorithmi denition of a Bernoulli sequene (a
simplest olletive) from the denition of Mises-Churh is onretized in the form of a
theorem: there exist Bernoulli (in the sense of Mises-Churh) sequenes x = (x1, x2, ...)
with density of ones p = 1
2
, with initial segments of entropy (omplexity) H(xn) =
H(x1, x2, ..., xn) = O(logn) (Kolmogorov).
For understanding of the talk an intuitive, not formal, familiarity with the onept of
a omputable funtion sues.
(Mosow Mathematial Soiety meeting, Otober 31, 1967)
II. [vol. 27, no. 2, 1972℄
1. A.N. Kolmogorov. Complexity of speifying and omplexity of onstruting math-
ematial objets.
1. Organizing mahine omputations requires dealing with evaluation of (a) omplexity
of programs, (b) the size of memory used, () duration of omputation. The talk
desribes a group of works that onsider similar onepts in a more abstrat manner.
2. It was notied in 1964-1965 that the minimal length K(x) of binary representation
of a program speifying onstrution of an objet x an be dened invariantly up
to an additive onstant (Solomono, A.N. Kolmogorov). This permitted using the
onept of denition omplexity K(x) of onstrutive mathematial objets as a
base for a new approah to foundations of information theory (A.N. Kolmogorov,
Levin) and probability theory (A.N. Kolmogorov, Martin-Lof, Shnorr, Levin).
3. Suh harateristis as required memory volume, or required duration of work
are harder to free of tehnial peuliarities of speial mahine types. But some
results may already be extrated from axiomati mahine-independent theory of
broad lass of similar harateristis (Blum, 1967). Let Π(p) be a harateristi of
onstrution omplexity of the objet x = A(p) by a program p, and Λ(p) denotes
the length of program p. The formula KnΠ(x) = inf(Λ(p) : x = A(p),Π(p) = n)
denes n-omplexity of denition of objet x (for unsatisable ondition the inf
is onsidered innite).
4. Barzdin's Theorem on the omplexity K(Mα) of prexes Mα of an enumerable set
of natural numbers (1968) and results of Barzdin, Kanovih, and Petri on orre-
sponding omplexitiesKnΠ(Mα), are of general mathematial interest, as they shed
some new light on the role of extending previously used formalizations in the de-
velopment of mathematis. The survey of the state of this irle of problems was
given in the form free from umbersome tehnial apparatus.
(Mosow Mathematial Soiety meeting, November 23, 1971)
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III. [Vol. 29,. no. 4 (155), 1974℄
1. A.N. Kolmogorov. Complexity of algorithms and objetive denition of random-
ness.
To eah onstrutive objet orresponds a funtion Φx(k) of a natural number k 
the log of minimal ardinality of x-ontaining sets that allow denitions of omplexity at
most k. If the element x itself allows a simple denition, then the funtion Φ drops to 1
even for small k. Laking suh a denition, the element is random in a negative sense.
But it is positively probabilistially random only when funtion Φ, having taken the
value Φ0 at a relatively small k = k0, then hanges approximately as Φ(k) = Φ0−(k−k0).
(Mosow Mathematial Soiety meeting, April 16, 1974)
Appendix B. Levin's letters to Kolmogorov
These letters do not have dates but were written after submission of [62℄ in August 1970
and before Kolmogorov went (in January 1971) to the oeanographi expedition (Dmitry
Mendeleev ship). Copies provided by L. Levin (and translated by A. Shen).
I.
Dear Andrei Nikolaevih! Few days ago I've obtained a result that I like a lot. May be
it ould be useful to you if you work on these topis while traveling on the ship.
This result gives a formulation for the foundations of probability theory dierent
from Martin-Lof. I think it is loser to your initial idea about the relation between
omplexity and randomness and is muh learer from the philosophial point of view (as,
e.g., [Yu. T.℄ Medvedev says).
Martin-Lof onsidered (for an arbitrary omputable measure P ) an algorithm that
studies a given sequene and nds more and more deviation from P -randomness hypoth-
esis. Suh an algorithm should be P -onsistent, i.e., nd deviations of size m only for
sequenes in a set that has measure at most 2−m. It is evident that a number m pro-
dued by suh an algorithm on input string x should be between 0 and − log2 P (x). Let
us onsider the omplementary value (− log2 P (x)) −m and all it the omplementary
test (the onsisteny requirement an be easily reformulated for omplementary tests).
Theorem. The logarithm of a priori probability [on the binary tree℄ − log2R(x) is
a P -onsistent omplementary test for every measure P and has the usual algorithmi
properties.
Let me remind you that by a priori probability I mean the universal semiomputable
measure introdued in our artile with Zvonkin. [See [62℄.℄ It is shown there that it [its
minus logarithm℄ is numerially lose to omplexity.
Let us onsider a spei omputable measure P . Compared to the universal Martin-
Lof test f (spei to a given measure P ) our test is not optimal up to an additive
onstant, but is asymptotially optimal. Namely, if the universal Martin-Lof test nds a
deviation m, our test nds a deviation at least m− 2 log2m − c. Therefore, the lass of
random innite banry sequenes remains the same.
Now look how nie it ts the philosophy. We say that a hypothesis x appeared
randomly aording to measure P  an be rejeted with ertainty m if the measure P
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is muh less onsistent with the appearene of x than a priori probability (this means
simply that P (x) < R(x)/2m. This gives a law of probability theory that is violated
with probability at most 2−m. Its violation an be established eetively sine R is
[lower℄ semiomputable [=enumerable from below℄. But if this law holds, all other laws
of probability theory [i.e., all Martin-Lof tests℄ hold, too. The drawbak is that it gives a
bit smaller value of randomness deieny (only m− 2 log2m− c instead of m), but this
is a prie for the universality (arbitrary probability distribution). The onnetion with
omplexity is provided beause − log2R(x) almost oinides with omplexity of x. Now
this onnetion does not depend on measure.
It is worth noting that the universal semiomputable measure has many interesting
appliations besides the above mentioned. You know its appliation to the analysis of
randomized algorithms. Also it is ofter useful in proofs (e.g., in the proof of J.T.Shwartz'
hypothesis regarding the omplexity of almost all trajetories of dynami systems). One
I used this measure to onstrut a denition of intuitionisti validity. All this show that
it is a rather natural quantity.
L.
II.
Dear Andrei Nikolaevih!
I would like to show that plain omplexity does not work if we want to provide an
exat denition of randomness, even for a nite ase. For the uniform distribution on
strings of xed length n the randomness deieny is dened as n minus omplexity. For
a non-uniform distribution length is replaed by minus the logarithm of probability.
It turns out that even for a distribution on a nite set the randomness deieny ould
be high on a set of large measure.
Example. Let
P (x) =
{
2−(l(x)+100), if l(x) ≤ 2100;
0, if l(x) > 2100.
Then | log2 P (x)| −K(x) exeeds 100 for all strings x.
A similar example an be onstruted for strings of some xed length (by adding zero
prexes). The violation ould be of logarithmi order.
Let me show you how to sharpen the denition of omplexity to get an exat result
(both for nite and innite sequenes).
Denitions. Let A be a monotone algorithm, i.e., for every x and every y that is a
prex of x, if A(x) is dened, then A(y) is dened too and A(y) is a prex of A(x). Let
us dene
KMA(x) =
{
min l(p) : x is a prex of A(p);
∞, if there is no suh p
The omplexity with respet to an optimal algorithm is denoted by KM(x).
Let P (x) be a omputable distribution on the Cantor spae Ω, i.e., P (x) is the measure
of the set Γx of all innite extensions of x.
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Theorem 1.
KM(x) ≤ | log2 P (x)|+O(1);
Theorem 2.
KM((ω)n) = | log2 P ((ω)n)|+O(1)
for P -almost all ω; here (ω)n stands for n-bit prex of ω. Moreover, the probability that
the randomness deieny exeeds m for some prex is bounded by 2−m.
Theorem 3. The sequenes ω suh that
KM((ω)n) = | log2 P ((ω)n)|+O(1);
satisfy all laws of probability theory (all Martin-Lof tests).
Let me use this oasion to tell you the results from my talk in the laboratory [of
statistial methods in Mosow State University℄: why one an omit non-omputable tests
(i.e., tests not denable without a strong language).
For this we need do improve the denition of omplexity one more. The plain om-
plexity K(x) has the following property:
Remark. Let Ai be an eetively given sequene of algorithms suh that
KAi+1(x) ≤ KAi(x)
for all i and x. Then there exists an algorithm A0 suh that
KA0(x) = 1 + min
i
KAi(x).
Unfortunately, it seems that KM(x) does not have this property. This an be or-
reted easily. Let Ai be an eetive sequene of monotone algorithms with nite domain
(provided as tables) suh that
KMAi+1(x) ≤ KMAi(x)
for all i and x. Let us dene then
KMAi(x) = min
i
KMAi(x).
Among all sequenes Ai there exists an optimal one, and the ompexity with respet to
this optimal sequene is denoted byKM(x). This omplexity oinides with the logarithm
of an universal semiomputable semimeasure [=a priori probability on the binary tree℄.
Theorem 4. KM(x) is a minimal semiomputable [from above℄ funtion that makes
Theorem 2 true.
Therefore no further improvements of KM are possible.
Now onsider the language [=set℄ of all funtions omputable with a xed nonom-
putable sequene [orale℄ α. Assume that α is ompliated enough, so this set ontains
the harateristi funtion of a universal enumerable set [0
′
℄.
We an dene then a relativized [ÿçûêîâóþ in the Russian original℄ omplexity
KMα(x) replaing algorithms by algorithms with orale α, i.e., funtions from this lan-
guage.
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Denition. A sequene ω is alled normal if
KM((ω)n) = KMα((ω)n) +O(1).
For a nite sequene ωn we dene the normality deieny as
KM(ωn)−KMα(ωn).
Theorem 5. A sequene obtained by an algorithm from a normal sequene is normal
itself.
Theorem 6. Let P be a probability distribution that is dened (in a natural enoding)
by a normal sequene. Then P -almost every sequene is normal.
This theorem exhibits a law of probability theory that says that a random proess
annot produe a non-normal sequene unless the probability distribution itself is not
normal. This is a muh more general law than standard laws of probability theory sine
it does not depend on the distribution. Moreover, Theorem 5 shows that this law is not
restrited to probability theory and an be onsidered as a univeral law of nature:
Thesis. Every sequene that appears in reality (nite or innite) has normality
deieny that does not exeed the omplexity of the desription (in a natural language)
of how it is physially produed, or its loation et.
It turns out that this normality law (that an be regarded as not onned in proba-
bility theory) and the law orresponding to the universal omputable test together imply
any law of probability theory (not neessary omputable) that an be desribed in the
language. Namely,the following result holds:
Theorem 7. Let P be a omputable probability distribution. If a sequene ω is normal
and passes the universal omputable P -test, then ω passes any test dened in our language
(i.e., every test omputable with orale α).
Note that for every set of measure 0 there exists a test (not neessary omputable) that
rejets all its elements.
Let us give one more iunteresting result that shows that all normal sequenes have
similar struture.
Theorem 8. Every normal sequene an be obtained by an algorithm from a sequene
that is random with respet to the uniform distribution.
III.
(This letter has no salutation. Levin realls that he often gave notes like this to Kol-
mogorov, who rarely had muh time to hear lengthy explanations and preferred something
written in any ase.)
We use a sequene α that provides a dense oding of a universal [reursively℄ enu-
merable set. For example, let α be the binary representation of [here the text the sum
of the a priori probabilities of all natural numbers is rossed out and replaed by the
following:℄ the real number ∑
p∈A
1
p · log2 p
where A is the domain of the optimal algorithm.
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A binary string p is a good ode for x if the optimal algorithm onverts the pair
(p,K(x)) into a list of strings that ontains x and the logarithm of the ardinality of this
list does not exeed K(x) + 3 logK(x)− l(p). (The existene of suh a ode means that
x is random when n ≥ l(p).)
We say that a binary string p is a anonial ode for x if every prex of p either is a
good ode for x or is a prex of α, and l(p) = K(x) + 2 logK(x).
Theorem 1. Every x (with nitely many exeptions) has a anonial ode p, and p
and x an be eetively transformed into eah other if K(x) is given.
Therefore, the non-randomness in x an appear only due to some very speial infor-
mation (a prex of α) ontained in x. I annot imagine how suh an x an be observed
in (extrated from) the real world sine α is not omputrable. And the task to study
the prexes of a spei sequene α seems to be very speial.
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